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STRIDE and the SSDLC – Helping you Design & set (Trust) Boundaries.

Read time: 8 mins
Last Updated on July 22, 2025
Published Feb. 24, 2024

The STRIDE model can be used as a different way to sort and understand different types of security threats in an app or service. Security teams usually bring STRIDE into play during the design phase of the Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDLC) so they can spot weak points early and figure out how to defend against them.

To make it even more effective, teams often pair STRIDE with Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) and the idea of Trust Boundaries. Together, these tools help map out how parts of the app interact, highlight where things could go wrong, and suggest fixes before attackers get a chance to exploit those gaps.

Security Threats Categories in STRIDE

Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege (STRIDE) was developed by Praerit Garg and Loren Kohnfelder at Microsoft and categorizes computer security threats using a mnemonic for those six categories and subsequently informs protection efforts by aligning these threat types with core principles of information security, facilitating early identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities.

Let's dive into the six specific categories:

Category Description of Threat
Spoofing Involves illegally accessing and then using another user's authentication information, such as a username and password.
Tampering Involves the malicious modification of data. Examples include unauthorized changes to persistent data (like data held in a database) or the alteration of data flowing between two computers over an open network, such as the Internet.
Repudiation Associated with users who deny performing an action when other parties have no way to prove otherwise. For instance, a user performs an illegal operation in a system that lacks the ability to trace the prohibited actions.
Information Disclosure Involves the exposure of information to individuals who are not supposed to have access to it. Examples include the ability of users to read a file they were not granted access to, or an intruder reading data in transit between two computers.
Denial of Service (DoS) These attacks deny service to valid users, for example, by making a Web server temporarily unavailable or unusable. Protection against certain types of DoS threats is necessary to improve system availability and reliability.
Elevation of Privilege Occurs when an unprivileged user gains privileged access, allowing them sufficient access to compromise or destroy the entire system. This includes situations where an attacker has penetrated all system defenses and effectively become part of the trusted system itself.

Using STRIDE to Help Inform Protection Efforts

The STRIDE model helps inform protection efforts by framing security conversations and aligning threats with fundamental security principles.

  1. Mapping to Core Security Principles:

    Each STRIDE category corresponds to a core principle of information security, helping developers understand which security goals are threatened:

    • Spoofing relates to Authenticity.
    • Tampering relates to Integrity.
    • Repudiation relates to Non-repudiability.
    • Information Disclosure relates to Confidentiality.
    • Denial of Service relates to Availability.
    • Elevation of Privilege relates to Authorization.
  2. Early Identification and Mitigation STRIDE modeling anticipates threats to the target system and is a core element of the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle. Using this model, software architects can identify and mitigate potential security issues early in the development process. Resolving these issues when they are relatively easy and cost-effective to fix significantly reduces the total cost of development.

  3. System Modeling and Threat Anticipation: STRIDE builds upon an overarching model of the system, which may include a full breakdown of processes, data stores, data flows, and trust boundaries. It is used to simplify overall security discussions and help users formulate pointed questions about vulnerabilities, such as, "How can an attacker change the authentication data?" or "What happens if access is denied to the user profile database?". The concept of Non-Repudiation refers to the ability of a system to counter repudiation threats; for instance, requiring a user to sign for an item upon receipt provides evidence that they received the package.

In short - the STRIDE model acts as a blueprint for security design, much like a diagnostic checklist a mechanic uses before repairing an engine: by systematically examining the six categories (S, T, R, I, D, E), developers can isolate which fundamental security components (Authenticity, Integrity, Confidentiality, etc.) are at risk and prioritize solutions before the system is finalized.

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security   AuthN   AuthZ   Authentication   Authorization   Availability   CIA   CIA Triad   Confidentiality   Core Security Principles   DFD   Data Flow Diagrams   Denial of Service   Design Phase   DevSecOps   DoS   Early Identification   Early Identification and Mitigation   Early Mitigation   Elevation of privilege   Information Disclosure   Integrity   Non-repudiability   Repudiation   SSDLC   STRIDE   SecDevOps   SecOps   Secure Software Development Lifecycle   Security Threats   Spoofing   System Modeling   Tampering   Threat Anticipation   Trust Boundaries   secure engineering   security architecture   MS SDL   Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle   2024